🚨 NEW on CISA KEV — exploited in the wild

🛡 UnrealIRCd UnrealIRCd
UnrealIRCd Improper Neutralization of Delimiters Vulnerability
CVE: CVE-2026-114713 · patch by 2026-11-16
📈 EPSS 0.3% exploitation probability

UnrealIRCd UnrealIRCd contains an improper neutralization of delimiters vulnerability that allows any user on a network with two or more linked servers to inject server-to-server commands that are executed with server authority.

🔗 https://ninjasignal.ninja/intel/cve/CVE-2026-114713
#cybersecurity #KEV #CVE #infosec

CVE ID: CVE-2026-114713
Vendor: UnrealIRCd
Product: UnrealIRCd
Date Added: 2026-11-13
CVE URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114713

CVE ID: CVE-2026-114713
Vendor: UnrealIRCd
Product: UnrealIRCd
Date Added: 2026-11-13
CVE URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114713

CVE ID: CVE-2026-123039
Vendor: Check Point
Product: Multiple Products
Date Added: 2026-11-13
CVE URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123039

🏆 New Achievement! Root Access, No Waiting!

AND THE CROWD GOES WILD as unknown attackers land CVE-2026-123039 — a privilege escalation on Check Point Security Gateways — chaining it with PHP2Shell to go straight to root. Opening bell was October 30, Israeli orgs took the first jabs, then the whole world stepped into the ring. Backdoors planted, configs looted, lateral movement into VMware ESXi, and then — yes — wiper malware, the haymaker that ends the fight in the ugliest way possible. (1/2)

CVE ID: CVE-2026-123039
Vendor: Check Point
Product: Multiple Products
Date Added: 2026-11-13
CVE URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123039

🏆 New Achievement! Root Access, No Waiting!

AND THE CROWD GOES WILD as unknown attackers land CVE-2026-123039 — a privilege escalation on Check Point Security Gateways — chaining it with PHP2Shell to go straight to root. Opening bell was October 30, Israeli orgs took the first jabs, then the whole world stepped into the ring. Backdoors planted, configs looted, lateral movement into VMware ESXi, and then — yes — wiper malware, the haymaker that ends the fight in the ugliest way possible. (1/2)

📢 Apache corrige une RCE critique dans HTTP Server (CVE-2026-119618) découverte par Anthropic et Google

⚠️ Vulnérabilité principale : CVE-2026-119618 Type : Race condition dans le module modhttp2 Versions affectées : Apache HTTP Server 2.4.55 à 2.4.70 Score CVSS : 9.8 (attribué par Red Hat) Impact : Exécution de code arbitraire à distance (RCE) sans…

📖 cyberveille : https://cyberveille.ch/posts/2026-11-13-apache-corrige-une-rce-critique-dans-http-server-cve-2026-119618-decouverte-par-anthropic-et-google/
🌐 source : https://www.securityweek.com/apache-patches-critical-http-server-rce-found-by-anthropic-google
🟢 vérification factuelle haute
#RCE #ApacheHTTPServer #Cyberveille

😳
CVE-2026-6460
"PostgreSQL type confusion after ALTER ... SET DATA TYPE executes arbitrary code"
#postgresql #sql #database #cve
https://www.postgresql.org/support/security/CVE-2026-6460/

PostgreSQL Security Update: 52 CVEs and a 22-Year-Old Bug

https://thecybersecguru.com/news/postgresql-security-update-52-cves-cve-2026-6460/

😳
CVE-2026-6460
"PostgreSQL type confusion after ALTER ... SET DATA TYPE executes arbitrary code"
#postgresql #sql #database #cve
https://www.postgresql.org/support/security/CVE-2026-6460/

😳
CVE-2026-6460
"PostgreSQL type confusion after ALTER ... SET DATA TYPE executes arbitrary code"
#postgresql #sql #database #cve
https://www.postgresql.org/support/security/CVE-2026-6460/

PostgreSQL Security Update: 52 CVEs and a 22-Year-Old Bug

https://thecybersecguru.com/news/postgresql-security-update-52-cves-cve-2026-6460/

🚨 Citrix patches 28 NetScaler security flaws, including a critical vulnerability affecting every default installation

Citrix has released urgent security updates addressing 28 vulnerabilities in NetScaler ADC and Gateway, including CVE-2026-120868 (CVSS 9.3), which affects all unpatched deployments without requiring any special configuration.

The flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to trigger memory corruption and potentially crash affected appliances. Another critical vulnerability, CVE-2026-107412 (CVSS 9.5), affects systems configured as VPN gateways or authentication servers.

Affected versions include NetScaler 13.1 and 14.1, with security fixes now available. Citrix is urging administrators to patch immediately, particularly internet-facing deployments.

Source: https://support.citrix.com/external/article/CTX697305

🚨 Citrix patches 28 NetScaler security flaws, including a critical vulnerability affecting every default installation

Citrix has released urgent security updates addressing 28 vulnerabilities in NetScaler ADC and Gateway, including CVE-2026-120868 (CVSS 9.3), which affects all unpatched deployments without requiring any special configuration.

The flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to trigger memory corruption and potentially crash affected appliances. Another critical vulnerability, CVE-2026-107412 (CVSS 9.5), affects systems configured as VPN gateways or authentication servers.

Affected versions include NetScaler 13.1 and 14.1, with security fixes now available. Citrix is urging administrators to patch immediately, particularly internet-facing deployments.

Source: https://support.citrix.com/external/article/CTX697305

🚨 Citrix patches 28 NetScaler security flaws, including a critical vulnerability affecting every default installation

Citrix has released urgent security updates addressing 28 vulnerabilities in NetScaler ADC and Gateway, including CVE-2026-120868 (CVSS 9.3), which affects all unpatched deployments without requiring any special configuration.

The flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to trigger memory corruption and potentially crash affected appliances. Another critical vulnerability, CVE-2026-107412 (CVSS 9.5), affects systems configured as VPN gateways or authentication servers.

Affected versions include NetScaler 13.1 and 14.1, with security fixes now available. Citrix is urging administrators to patch immediately, particularly internet-facing deployments.

Source: https://support.citrix.com/external/article/CTX697305

🚨 Citrix patches 28 NetScaler security flaws, including a critical vulnerability affecting every default installation

Citrix has released urgent security updates addressing 28 vulnerabilities in NetScaler ADC and Gateway, including CVE-2026-120868 (CVSS 9.3), which affects all unpatched deployments without requiring any special configuration.

The flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to trigger memory corruption and potentially crash affected appliances. Another critical vulnerability, CVE-2026-107412 (CVSS 9.5), affects systems configured as VPN gateways or authentication servers.

Affected versions include NetScaler 13.1 and 14.1, with security fixes now available. Citrix is urging administrators to patch immediately, particularly internet-facing deployments.

Source: https://support.citrix.com/external/article/CTX697305

Odd that the MSRC advisory for CVE-2026-125350 itself doesn't mention that there's an exploit in the wild: https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/advisory/CVE-2026-125350

They usually do.

Odd that the MSRC advisory for CVE-2026-125350 itself doesn't mention that there's an exploit in the wild: https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/advisory/CVE-2026-125350

They usually do.

MongoDB Patches Critical Flaw Allowing Server Crashes and Code Execution

MongoDB patched a critical use-after-free vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-118383, that allows unauthenticated attackers to crash database servers during failover. The flaw affects multiple versions of MongoDB Server and could potentially lead to arbitrary code execution.

**If you run MongoDB Server, update every server in your replica set ASAP to version 8.0.37, 7.0.18, 6.0.21 or 5.0.33. Move off the unsupported 8.2 branch, which stays vulnerable. If you use MongoDB Atlas, don't postpone scheduled maintenance, plan to trigger the update at earliest scheduled time. Always make sure your database is reachable only from trusted systems. A password alone will not stop this attack.**
#cybersecurity #infosec #advisory #vulnerability
https://beyondmachines.net/event_details/mongodb-patches-critical-flaw-allowing-server-crashes-and-code-execution-x-c-v-z-g/gD2P6Ple2L

MongoDB Patches Critical Flaw Allowing Server Crashes and Code Execution

MongoDB patched a critical use-after-free vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-118383, that allows unauthenticated attackers to crash database servers during failover. The flaw affects multiple versions of MongoDB Server and could potentially lead to arbitrary code execution.

**If you run MongoDB Server, update every server in your replica set ASAP to version 8.0.37, 7.0.18, 6.0.21 or 5.0.33. Move off the unsupported 8.2 branch, which stays vulnerable. If you use MongoDB Atlas, don't postpone scheduled maintenance, plan to trigger the update at earliest scheduled time. Always make sure your database is reachable only from trusted systems. A password alone will not stop this attack.**
#cybersecurity #infosec #advisory #vulnerability
https://beyondmachines.net/event_details/mongodb-patches-critical-flaw-allowing-server-crashes-and-code-execution-x-c-v-z-g/gD2P6Ple2L

📢 Exploitation active de CVE-2026-102895 : contournement d'authentification dans GPUStack

Cet article documente des tentatives d'exploitation actives de la vulnérabilité CVE-2026-102895 affectant GPUStack, un logiciel open-source de gestion de clusters GPU utilisé pour les charges de travail IA. CVE-2026-102895 est une vulnérabilité de…

📖 cyberveille : https://cyberveille.ch/posts/2026-11-13-exploitation-active-de-cve-2026-102895-contournement-d-authentification-dans-gpustack/
🌐 source : https://dshield.org/diary/Exploit+Attempts+for+GPUStack+Authentication+Bypass+CVE2026102895/33514/
🟡 vérification factuelle moyenne
#GPUStack #AIInfrastructure #Cyberveille

🚨 EUVD-2026-125778

📊 Score: 7.8/10 (CVSS v3.1)
📅 Updated: 2026-11-13

📝 A flaw was found in abrt. The completeness check introduced to mitigate CVE-2026-54228 and CVE-2026-54229 only verifies that a dump directory contains a "count" element, which an unprivileged user can create. This allows a local attacker to bypass the guard and again poison elements in, or se...

🔗 https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-125778

#cybersecurity #infosec #euvd #cve #vulnerability

🚨 EUVD-2026-125778

📊 Score: 7.8/10 (CVSS v3.1)
📅 Updated: 2026-11-13

📝 A flaw was found in abrt. The completeness check introduced to mitigate CVE-2026-54228 and CVE-2026-54229 only verifies that a dump directory contains a "count" element, which an unprivileged user can create. This allows a local attacker to bypass the guard and again poison elements in, or se...

🔗 https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-125778

#cybersecurity #infosec #euvd #cve #vulnerability

🚨 EUVD-2026-125778

📊 Score: 7.8/10 (CVSS v3.1)
📅 Updated: 2026-11-13

📝 A flaw was found in abrt. The completeness check introduced to mitigate CVE-2026-54228 and CVE-2026-54229 only verifies that a dump directory contains a "count" element, which an unprivileged user can create. This allows a local attacker to bypass the guard and again poison elements in, or se...

🔗 https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-125778

#cybersecurity #infosec #euvd #cve #vulnerability

🚨 EUVD-2026-125778

📊 Score: 7.8/10 (CVSS v3.1)
📅 Updated: 2026-11-13

📝 A flaw was found in abrt. The completeness check introduced to mitigate CVE-2026-54228 and CVE-2026-54229 only verifies that a dump directory contains a "count" element, which an unprivileged user can create. This allows a local attacker to bypass the guard and again poison elements in, or se...

🔗 https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-125778

#cybersecurity #infosec #euvd #cve #vulnerability

📢 Triple zero-day Ivanti Connect Secure : chaîne d'exploitation CVE-2026-104935/111357/118527

Cet article analyse une chaîne d'exploitation triple zero-day affectant Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS), un appliance SSL VPN largement déployé en périphérie de réseau. L'exploitation active a été confirmée dès le 3 octobre 2026, avant la…

📖 cyberveille : https://cyberveille.ch/posts/2026-11-11-triple-zero-day-ivanti-connect-secure-chaine-d-exploitation-cve-2026-104935-111357-118527/
🌐 source : https://www.criminalip.io/knowledge-hub/blog/38984#mtm_campaign=Weekly-CIP-Newsletter
🟡 vérification factuelle moyenne
#IvantiConnectSecure #ChaîneDExploitation #Cyberveille

CVE-2026-71855 in Suricata: IPv4/IPv6 flow-state mixup enables detection bypass. CVSS 5.9. Fixed in 7.0.17 and 8.0.6. Update now. #CVE #infosec #Suricata https://www.valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-71855/

CVE-2026-77339 Process Compose: DNS rebinding lets malicious sites hit the unauthenticated MCP SSE listener and run control tools. CVSS 7.5. Patch under review, so at least upgrade to 1.120.0 now. #CVE #infosec #cybersecurity https://www.valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-77339/

SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions

1. ScreenConnect architecture and attack surfaces
2. Attack chain overview
3. Mitigation and protection guidance
4. Indicators of compromise and supporting artifacts
5. References
6. Learn More

Beginning on November 11, 2026, ConnectWise reported an active campaign of a threat actor gaining unauthorized access to cloud-hosted ConnectWise ScreenConnect instances belonging to managed service providers (MSPs). Microsoft Threat Intelligence has confirmed ConnectWise’s reported activity and we have also observed threat actors abusing ScreenConnect, a legitimate remote-support application, to install unauthorized remote-access clients and deploy a malicious worm, SCKit, on ConnectWise customer managed endpoints.

Additionally, Microsoft analyzed the malicious worm’s behavior: deployment starts with commands issued through ScreenConnect to silently install an identical client connected to threat actor-controlled infrastructure. A batch launcher retrieves a PowerShell decoder that decrypts and extracts SCKit using device-specific key material. The toolkit establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and registry Run entries and deploys RelayTrap, a component designed to deliver a malicious payload to a connecting technician.

We have identified that the worm targets IT support technician workstations using the hijacked authenticated ScreenConnect Session and uses the victim’s management console to distribute payloads to other managed devices. The resulting access to either target enables threat actors to remotely administer affected endpoints, execute commands, and deploy further tools independently of the legitimate support instance.

Defenders should investigate technician workstations and downstream affected endpoints. Removing an unauthorized client alone does not remove the toolkit’s persistence or invalidate exposed web sessions. In this blog, we examine SCKit’s attack chain and payload components and provide mitigation guidance, indicators of compromise, and Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting queries to help organizations identify and disrupt this activity.

ScreenConnect, formerly ConnectWise Control, is a remote-support and access platform used by MSPs to administer customer devices, often alongside remote monitoring and management (RMM) software. Its operating model has three parts:

• Management instance. A cloud-hosted or on-premises ScreenConnect server provides the web console and manages sessions. Its relay service carries communication between the technician and endpoint clients.
• Technician workstation. Support staff sign in to the console through a browser and launch a local host client for interactive support.
• Customer endpoint. An installed guest, or access, client maintains unattended access and executes commands delivered through ScreenConnect.

An Access session provides persistent, unattended access through the installed client. A Support session is a temporary connection that an end user joins for assistance. ScreenConnect also supports remote commands from the web console without an interactive technician session. The endpoint client receives the command and runs it on the customer device; the technician workstation is not an intermediary for that execution.

Extensions are add-ons installed on the ScreenConnect server to add features or integrate with other products, including ticketing and RMM tools. ConnectWise Automate was formerly named LabTech; Labtech Plus is a third-party extension, not the Automate product itself. The RMM+ extension family exposes remote-command APIs protected by a separately configured passphrase rather than the technician’s normal console sign-in.

ConnectWise’s advisory describes a reported authentication flaw in RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32: when no access key was configured, the extension accepted an empty key. In that configuration, an unauthorized caller could submit commands to the server’s API for delivery to managed endpoints without a normal ScreenConnect user sign-in. ConnectWise is investigating extension abuse as an initial-access route; the entry method for the reported campaign remains under investigation.

SCKit is a malware toolkit that includes RelayTrap, a malicious replacement for the ScreenConnect client on an affected customer endpoint. RelayTrap is designed to deliver a payload to a technician’s workstation when they connect for support. ConnectWise states that the fix for CVE-2026-84869 blocks the toolkit’s attempted endpoint-to-technician spread. This client-side attack path is separate from the server-side access used to deploy SCKit.

The deployment sequence below runs on the customer endpoint. It establishes a separate remote-access connection and prepares the scripts and RelayTrap component that target a later technician

The threat actor uses the MSP’s ScreenConnect management instance to direct the installed endpoint client to start cmd.exe. That local process invokes curl.exe to download an MSI over HTTP from an attacker-controlled ScreenConnect server. The command requests /Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi with access-session parameters and a c=Exploited<N> marker (c=Exploited9 in the illustrated command), and saves the installer to C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi.

Windows Installer then installs the package silently on that endpoint, without restarting it, using /i, /qn, and /norestart. The added client connects to an attacker-controlled ScreenConnect instance, creating a remote-access channel separate from the MSP’s approved instance. Securing access to the legitimate console does not remove this additional client or its connection.

Further commands on the customer endpoint stage the toolkit. A PowerShell command decodes a URL-safe Base64 string and writes the result to a batch file in Windows Temp. The batch sets BATPATH to its own location, downloads the decoder from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=4, and starts it with -Mode full.

The decoder reads BATPATH, or falls back to SCKIT_SELF, to locate the launcher. Its hidden-relaunch branch creates a VBScript wrapper and runs it through wscript.exe to start the same batch without a visible window.

The scripts use the following p values at the same server path to request individual components:

The decoder reads MachineGuid from HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography and includes it as the m request parameter. The response provides a Base64-encoded body and two headers, X-Lab-Half and X-Lab-Salt.

To derive the decryption key, the decoder hashes the UTF-8 machine identifier with SHA-256, XORs that hash with 32 bytes decoded from X-Lab-Half, and appends the machine-identifier bytes to the recovered secret material. PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 then derives a 32-byte key using the response salt and 4,096 iterations.

The decoder uses the first 16 bytes of the decoded response body as the initialization vector (IV). It decrypts the remaining bytes using AES-256-CBC with PKCS7 padding, decompresses the plaintext with GZip, and writes the resulting ZIP archive. The archive is then extracted to %TEMP%\SCKitBundle.

In full mode, the decoder prepares %TEMP%\SCKit\trapkit\payload and stages the watcher, installer, alert script, and RelayTrap.cs. It also copies its batch launcher into the payload directory for RelayTrap to distribute. The copied launcher retrieves the decoder and starts toolkit deployment.

The decoder also stages ToolboxRelayUploader.exe for console-based payload distribution and retrieves sqlite3.exe for browser-cookie queries if a suitable copy is absent. It includes two launch paths: full mode starts the distribution script without a separate configuration file and supplies a local script path; the other path stages a helper and lab-context.json and passes -SkipLocalExecution.

Alongside the bundle decoder, SCKit includes a separate loader for encrypted PowerShell scripts. Unlike the decoder, which retrieves and expands an archive, this component requests a script using p=1 with the machine identifier. It applies the same secret-recovery, PBKDF2, AES-CBC, and GZip operations, but uses a salt embedded in its source rather than one supplied in a response header.

After decompression, the loader converts the bytes to UTF-8 text and writes %TEMP%\k<32-hex>.ps1, using a newly generated random GUID for the filename. It starts a hidden PowerShell process to run the file with the forwarded arguments, then attempts to remove the script after the child process exits.

On the customer endpoint, persistence keeps the toolkit available for a later support connection. The deployment places scripts under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap. The RelayTrapLiteAlert value in the machine-wide CurrentVersion\Run key launches an alert script at user logon. A scheduled task starts the watcher with a payload filename and lists of client identifiers and relay hosts to exclude. The -PollSeconds 10 argument configures the watcher to poll every 10 seconds.

The watcher enumerates ScreenConnect client services and reads their executable paths and connection parameters. For each client, its build routine creates a directory under trapbins, copies libraries from that client’s installation, and uses the .NET C# compiler to build RelayTrap.exe. It checks for changes to the source or client libraries before rebuilding.

RelayTrap is designed to reuse the customer endpoint’s ScreenConnect connection details in place of its normal client. When a technician connects with a vulnerable host client, RelayTrap attempts to deliver the staged batch launcher through that session. The launcher retrieves the same decoder, extending the toolkit’s deployment design from the customer device to the technician workstation. Configured skip lists exclude specified client identifiers and relay hosts from processing.

ScreenConnect services are also configured for automatic startup. Registry writes target Microsoft Defender Antivirus path exclusions for staged MSI copies and CWInstall_…\Installer.ps1. The installer configuration lists sc[.]payproofkit[.]com and cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com as additional ScreenConnect MSI sources. A subsequent curl.exe command downloads another client installer from sc[.]payproofkit[.]com.

SCKit also targets the technician’s browser, which is used to sign in to the management console. The browser-access code searches Chrome, Edge, Opera, and Opera GX profiles for cookies named .ASPXAUTH. Its database route identifies associated hosts and queries encrypted cookie values. It copies cookie databases and their supporting files, with a volume-shadow-copy fallback for locked databases. The decryption code uses the Chromium master key and the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) in the current user’s context, with AES-GCM routines for v10 and v11 cookie values.

The memory-scanning route first examines browser network-service processes identified by network.mojom.NetworkService in their command lines. An embedded C# scanner uses OpenProcess, VirtualQueryEx, and ReadProcessMemory to inspect readable committed memory regions for cookie strings and nearby host strings. If the initial scan finds no candidates, it scans other browser processes.

The console-distribution component is designed to combine an authentication cookie with the required anti-forgery and access tokens, enumerate accessible sessions, upload a payload using ToolboxRelayUploader.exe, and queue execution through the Shared Toolbox. The workflow also includes removing the uploaded Toolbox item after distribution.

This component targets the technician’s management-console access, rather than only the original customer device. The account’s permissions determine which additional sessions and devices the distribution workflow can reach.

The toolkit’s cleanup script places a stop marker in the trap directory. It removes trap-related tasks, services, processes, Run entries, and files, and restores ScreenConnect client services unless client removal was requested. It then removes any remaining stop marker to allow a newly deployed watcher to run.

After running the cleanup script, the decoder’s cleanup mode starts the bundled dropper again unless -NoReArm is set. Cleanup therefore also serves as a path to redeploy the toolkit.

Address the server-side extension APIs and technician clients separately. Extension authentication and client-side file transfer are different attack surfaces; securing one does not remove the other or an existing endpoint installation.

• Keep the identified extensions disabled. Follow the vendor advisory for Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, and RMM+ Password Link. Review their installation and configuration history alongside administrative access.
• Update technician clients separately from the console. ConnectWise states that ScreenConnect client 26.6.5 and later block the toolkit’s attempted endpoint-to-technician transfer technique. The fix for CVE-2026-84869 was released on September 8, 2026. Verify each technician client’s installed version; a cloud-console update does not automatically update those clients. The vendor bulletin also describes temporary file-transfer restrictions while updates are pending.

• Investigate through a separate channel. Use Microsoft Defender for Endpoint live response or another approved out-of-band method instead of ScreenConnect on a suspected affected device. Isolate affected endpoints and include connecting technician workstations in scope.
• Preserve console and endpoint evidence. Retain extension, authentication, Run Command, and Toolbox records together with process, file, task, and registry history. Review Toolbox history for tools removed after use, and inspect queued commands and tools before reconnecting devices.
• Revoke exposed sessions from a clean device. Invalidate affected ScreenConnect web sessions and associated identity-provider sessions, rotate exposed credentials, and review accounts and permissions. Password changes alone do not address every existing session.
• Remove persistence and unapproved clients. Validate each client’s enrolled instance and relay destination before removing it. Remove malicious tasks, Run values, trap files, and unauthorized exclusions through approved response tooling. Do not use a cleanup script recovered from the kit as a remediation tool.
• Verify the complete state before restoring connectivity. Confirm approved services and destinations, effective antivirus settings, and the absence of re-created tasks or scripts. Review tamper-protection events when investigating exclusion changes. Rebuild devices when integrity cannot be established.

Keep Microsoft Defender Antivirus, cloud-delivered protection, and tamper protection enabled. Verify that devices meet the requirements for protecting antivirus exclusions. Maintain an inventory of authorized remote-management instances and use application control to restrict unapproved software.

Microsoft Defender XDR customers can use the following Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alert titles to investigate activity associated with this threat. Review related alerts together with device timelines and ScreenConnect audit records to trace command execution, persistence, browser-data access, and network connections.

Microsoft Defender XDR customers can use the following threat analytics report to get the latest intelligence on SCKit and the abuse of ScreenConnect, including protection status, affected assets, and recommended actions for their environment.

Customers can access the threat analytics report: SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions

Customers can also access recommended controls and guidance on Secure Now.

Each query below runs independently and uses a 14-day lookback. Adjust the time range to the investigation window and available retention, and correlate results with approved administrative activity.

Connections to campaign infrastructure

Find connections to the listed domains and IP addresses. Review the full destination, initiating process, and approved remote-support infrastructure for each match.

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (
    "ns.mo7sen.dev", "sc.payproofkit.com",
    "newnewnew.gotdns.org", "soxnewwork.homedns.org",
    "cdn007-digitaldownloads.com")
    or RemoteIP in ("185.99.255.28", "155.94.150.39")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ReportId

Toolkit command lines and cookie-query activity

Find command lines containing distinctive toolkit names, staging paths, installer markers, or cookie-query strings.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "/EadF.php"
    or ProcessCommandLine contains "SCKit"
    or ProcessCommandLine contains "RelayTrap"
    or ProcessCommandLine contains "Panel-Lateral"
    or ProcessCommandLine contains "ToolboxRelayUploader"
    or ProcessCommandLine contains ".ASPXAUTH"
    or ProcessCommandLine contains "c=Exploited"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName,
    ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, ReportId

Known installer, archive, and uploader files

Find file events for the sc.msi package, staged ZIP, and uploader using their SHA-1 hashes. The query uses SHA-1 because SHA256 is usually unpopulated in DeviceFileEvents. Combine hash matches with command-line and persistence findings.

DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where SHA1 in~ (
    "0be01e7bd69cfdd222645d49bb5ad9961372fef2",
    "3f81c9c874a896c46e4bccea2fad2eaa3d9f2054",
    "13ce33b19daee3963f7e15d461b191c38f6bc0d3")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath,
    SHA1, InitiatingProcessFileName, ReportId

Registry values referencing RelayTrap

Find writes to the RelayTrapLiteAlert value or values containing RelayTrap. Review the registry key, value data, and initiating process.

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryValueName =~ "RelayTrapLiteAlert"
    or RegistryValueData contains "RelayTrap"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RegistryKey,
    RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, ReportId

RelayTrap scheduled-task events

Find scheduled-task events containing RelayTrap or TrapWatch. Inspect the task definition to identify its triggers, executable, and arguments.

DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActionType contains "ScheduledTask"
| where AdditionalFields contains "RelayTrap"
    or AdditionalFields contains "TrapWatch"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ActionType,
    AdditionalFields, InitiatingProcessFileName, ReportId

Microsoft Defender Antivirus path-exclusion writes

Find Microsoft Defender Antivirus path-exclusion registry writes. Review changes naming Windows Temp, ConnectWiseControl_, CWInstall_, or RelayTrap, and verify their authorization and effective policy.

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryKey contains @"\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RegistryKey,
    RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, ReportId

SCKit – Generated PowerShell Loader Artifacts

Identifies temporary PowerShell files matching the k<32-hex>.ps1 naming pattern generated by the SCKit loader, potentially revealing staged payloads independently of known file hashes or infrastructure.

DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName matches regex @"(?i)^k[0-9a-f]{32}\.ps1$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName,
ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256,
InitiatingProcessFileName

Network addresses are defanged. Use the installer hashes to locate the listed packages, then verify the client’s enrolled ScreenConnect instance and related activity. The toolkit also uses the legitimate SQLite utility; investigate its use alongside the browser-cookie queries described above.

Hashes identify individual files. The watcher compiles RelayTrap against local client libraries, and embedded configuration changes script hashes. Use file and process behavior to investigate other builds. The table includes configuration, cleanup, and proof artifacts to support the investigation.

• ConnectWise security investigation and partner guidance (advisory covering the RMM+ extension authentication flaw). ConnectWise (accessed 2026-11-13)
• ScreenConnect security bulletin, 2026-09-08 (CVE-2026-84869 fix and client 26.6.5 guidance). ConnectWise (accessed 2026-11-13)
• ScreenConnect extensions. ConnectWise (accessed 2026-11-13)
• 6 tips for ConnectWise Control partners (remote commands from the web console). ConnectWise (accessed 2026-11-13)
• Requirements for protecting antivirus exclusions with tamper protection. Microsoft Learn (accessed 2026-11-13)
• Investigate entities on devices using live response. Microsoft Learn (accessed 2026-11-13)
• Take response actions on a device. Microsoft Learn (accessed 2026-11-13)
• Advanced hunting best practices in Microsoft Defender XDR. Microsoft Learn (accessed 2026-11-13)
• DeviceFileEvents table (advanced hunting schema). Microsoft Learn (accessed 2026-11-13)

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Review our documentation to learn more about our real-time protection capabilities and see how to enable them within your organization.  

• Learn more about securing Copilot Studio agents with Microsoft Defender 
• Evaluate your AI readiness with our latest Zero Trust for AI workshop.
• Microsoft 365 Copilot AI security documentation
• How Microsoft discovers and mitigates evolving attacks against AI guardrails
• Prompt injection protection in Microsoft Defender for Office 365 – official documentation of the prompt injection protection in Microsoft Defender for Office 365.
• How Microsoft discovers and mitigates evolving attacks against AI guardrails | Microsoft Security Blog
• Manipulating AI memory for profit: The rise of AI Recommendation Poisoning | Microsoft Security Blog – a related example of an AI-era technique observed in email traffic
• Defending the inbox against prompt injection attacks | Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Blog – feature announcement introducing prompt injection protection in Microsoft Defender for Office 365.
• Learn how Microsoft is reimagining the SOC for the agentic era with ISOC in Microsoft Defender

The post SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

🔵 THREAT INTELLIGENCE

SCKit Malware Turns ScreenConnect Support Sessions Into Potential MSP Attack Paths

Vulnerability | CRITICAL
CVEs: CVE-2026-84869

The ongoing campaign targeting ConnectWise ScreenConnect deployments involves the exploitation of a now-patched critical security flaw in the remote...

Full analysis:
https://www.yazoul.net/news/article/sckit-malware-turns-screenconnect-support-sessions-into-potential-msp-attack-pat/?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=social

by Yazoul AI

#InfoSec #ZeroDay #ThreatHunting

CVE-2026-55556 Rsyslog imhttp code execution, CVSS 7.5. Unauthenticated attacker can trigger it via oversized Basic auth headers. Patch still under review, so restrict imhttp exposure now. #CVE #infosec #Rsyslog https://www.valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-55556/